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Abstract: This article reflects on the ambitions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) to foster regional economic and financial integration among its member countries 
against the backdrop of the European financial crisis. Based on a review of the European 
experiences with financial integration since the 1970s, this article critically examines the 
potential risks associated with the creation of a financially-integrated ASEAN Economic 
Community and the implications for policy autonomy of ASEAN members. It outlines the 
regulatory and institutional requirements that need to be put in place in order to minimize 
financial stability risk if an integrated financial sector across ASEAN is aimed for. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial integration is an important part of ASEAN's goal to establish an ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC). In 2007, the member states' heads of state/government endorsed the AEC 
Blueprint that outlines the path to establishing the AEC by 2015. The AEC Blueprint 
comprises far-reaching plans for financial services liberalization among member states as well 
as measures aimed at fostering capital market development and integration, including a 
dismantling of capital account restrictions in order to achieve a "freer flow of capital" across 
ASEAN. Numerous working committees have been negotiating the modes of liberalization 
and schedules. The ASEAN central bank governors are currently devising a framework for 
banking integration that will allow qualified ASEAN banks to operate across the region. 
A study published in April 2013 jointly by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
ASEAN Secretariat posits that the formation of the AEC "will benefit from the successful 
liberalization of the capital account and the domestic financial market in individual countries, 
and from the ASEAN-wide integration of financial markets and institutions supported by 
regulatory harmonization and the strengthening of policy coordination among the member 
states" (ADB and ASEAN 2013: 1)1. While financial integration can certainly benefit the 
region and contribute to financial development in the less developed ASEAN economies, 
there are also substantial risks that come with capital account and financial liberalization. 
Liberalization will also have far-reaching consequences for national policy autonomy. The 
financial stability risks as well as implications of close financial integration for policy 
autonomy have been highlighted by the recent European experiences. Against the backdrop of 
the European crisis, this article thus reflects on the merits and risks of (regional) financial 
integration and underscores the great importance of designing an appropriate regulatory and 
supervisory framework to safeguard financial stability in an integrated area. 
The next section will look into the European experiences with financial integration since the 
1970s and discuss how regional financial integration contributed to the European crisis and 
what could have been done differently to prevent it. Section 3 will then turn to the developing 
framework for ASEAN financial integration and discuss implications and lessons of the 
European experiences. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                           
1
 The study was launched on the sidelines of the Ninth ASEAN Central Bank Governors meeting in Brunei in 
April 2013. In a press release, the ASEAN Central Bank Governors (2013) stated: "The Summary Report is a 
joint initiative of the ASEAN central banks and monetary authorities, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Asian 
Development Bank. The Central Bank Governors view this Report as an important reference for ASEAN to 
further guide its financial integration process." 
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2. European financial integration and the European crisis of 2010– 
2.1 Background to European financial integration 
From the second half of the 1970s, European policy makers increasingly worked toward an 
integration of European financial markets, which was widely regarded as being conducive to 
trade integration and expected to unleash the growth potential of member countries. European 
financial integration was fostered through market deregulation, which was "shaped both by 
the abolition of capital account restrictions and the adoption of common legislative standards" 
(Buch and Heinrich 2003:32). Although some European countries had lifted restrictions on 
capital flows on an individual basis earlier, the liberalization of capital controls across the 
European Community was completed only in the early 1990s as the Single European Act of 
1986 was implemented to remove all legal barriers to an internal market. Several countries, 
including Belgium (1991), France (1990), Greece (1994), Luxembourg (1990), Portugal 
(1992) and Spain (1992), maintained capital controls until then (Table 1).2 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The harmonization of regulation and financial integration were propelled by the European 
Community's First and Second Banking Directives. The First Banking Directive on The 
Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up 
and Pursuit of Credit Institutions, which was adopted in 1977, was the first step toward the 
harmonization of banking regulation. In particular, it applied the principle of non-
discrimination against businesses from other member states to the banking sector and 
established the principle of home country control, according to which responsibility for the 
supervision of a bank would be gradually transferred from the host to the home country of the 
parent institution (Dermine 2003). A "single passport" for banks was introduced through the 
Second Banking Directive of 1989, which was fully implemented by the beginning of 1993. 
Under the single passport policy, banking licenses are mutually recognized and a bank 
                                                           
2
 The liberalization of capital accounts was actually one factor that contributed to the 1992/93 crisis of the 
European Monetary System, the fixed exchange rate system that preceded the euro. As Wyplosz (2004:262) 
pointed out: "In the 10 years between its creation in 1979 and 1990, when capital accounts were freed, there 
were 12 realignments, most of them involving several currencies. With few exceptions, these realignments came 
in the wake of speculative attacks, yet the system survived. The first attack that occurred after capital 
liberalization was lethal". 
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licensed in any member state can operate freely across the European Economic Area (EEA),3 
with foreign branches being subject to home country supervision.4 Furthermore, the Second 
Banking Directive harmonized capital adequacy standards. 
A further push for financial integration came when the European Council launched the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in May 1999. The FSAP, which comprised numerous 
initiatives to ensure the full integration of European Union (EU) banking and capital markets 
by 2005, put forward three strategic objectives: (i) establishing a single EU market in 
wholesale financial services; (ii) making retail markets open and secure; and (iii) development 
of state-of-the-art prudential rules and supervision (EU 2006). The FSAP was endorsed by the 
Lisbon European Council in March 2000 and implementation started in 2001. 
Research by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010:77) has shown that legislative-regulatory 
harmonization policies in financial services have contributed decisively to the deepening of 
European financial markets and that "cross-border banking activities increased significantly 
among European countries that quickly adopted the financial services Directives of the 
FSAP". This indicates that "financial services legislative harmonization is a significant driver 
of banking integration" (ibid.). 
Moreover, financial integration was fostered through European Monetary Union and the 
adoption of the euro as a single currency by 11 member states in 1999.5 As highlighted by the 
ECB (2012a:108), "the catalytic effect of European Monetary Union [...] fostered a continuing 
process of integration in European financial markets and brought about a surge in intra-euro 
area cross-border investment".6 According to estimates by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010), cross-
border bilateral bank holdings and transactions rose by about 40 per cent among eurozone 
members after the introduction of the euro. A major factor behind the increase in financial 
integration among eurozone members was the elimination of currency risk.7 However, it 
should be noted that integration in the different segments of the financial markets advanced at 
a different pace: while integration in the bond, equity, and wholesale banking markets 
                                                           
3
 The EEA comprises the member countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. 
4
 According to Dermine (2003), "[t]he Second Banking Directive called for home country control on solvency, 
which, under this directive, extends to the bank itself, its foreign and national subsidiaries which have to be 
consolidated for supervisory purposes, and its foreign branches. With regard to the latter, the host state retains 
the right to regulate a foreign bank's activities in that state only to the extent that such regulation is necessary for 
the protection of 'public interest'." 
5
 Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and 
Finland. Six countries joined later: Greece (2001), Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta (2008), Slovakia 
(2009) and Estonia (2011). 
6
 See also ECB (2006). 
7
 See also Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010). 
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progressed rapidly, integration of the retail banking market was slow (Kleimeier and Sander 
2007). 
 
2.2 How did financial integration contribute to the European crisis?8 
Financial and monetary integration led to a big drop in nominal and real interest rates in the 
periphery countries. The expanded access to funding from abroad and the drop in real interest 
rates in the periphery countries set off a boom which attracted further capital inflows. These 
were reinforced because several Northern European countries, most notably Germany, had 
entered the euro with an overvalued exchange rate which dampened economic activity there. 
Since investment opportunities looked much better in the periphery countries at the time, 
capital flew from the core countries to the periphery, fuelling their booms. That the risk of 
central government bonds of eurozone member countries was weighted at zero in regulatory 
capital calculations and the fact that the Eurosystem (the ECB and the national central banks) 
treated such debt with no haircut when these were offered as collateral for repos and other 
collateral financing trades fuelled appetite for investment in sovereign bonds of periphery 
countries which still yielded slightly higher returns than those of center countries. 
The large flows of capital from the centre to the periphery fuelled excessive credit dynamics, 
construction sector booms and real estate bubbles (Ireland, Spain), and excessive fiscal 
spending (Greece). The booms also led to rising unit labor costs and real exchange rate 
appreciation, causing a loss of economic competitiveness of the periphery countries vis-à-vis 
the center countries and current account deficits to widen. 
In essence, the European crisis followed a pattern similar to that seen in numerous developing 
and emerging market crises before, even if the channels of contagion effects differed because 
of the common currency. Today's European crisis countries experienced what a large number 
of developing and emerging countries (including those in Southeast Asia) went through over 
the past decades: a period of strong yet unsustainable output growth fuelled by capital inflow 
surges – or "capital flow bonanzas" as Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) call them – was followed 
by a "sudden stop" (Calvo 1998). At that point, financial integration through private markets 
stalled and went into reverse (Watson 2012). The reversal of private capital flows raised risk 
premiums which worsened governments' fiscal positions and forced painful adjustments in the 
crisis economies. 
                                                           
8
 The focus here is how financial integration contributed to the crisis, not on overall explanation of crisis causes. 
For a more comprehensive analysis of the causes behind the European crisis see, for instance, Volz (2012a). 
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The capital flow bonanzas in the periphery countries were made possible because of 
unrestricted capital flows and tightly integrated banking and capital markets.9 
Macroprudential regulation that could have prevented excessive credit dynamics and the 
development of financial and property bubbles was not in place since prudential policies 
concentrated on the micro level only. 
Although much blame for the crisis was put on thriftless government spending (including 
supposedly too generous spending on social security and public welfare) in public discourse, 
as a matter of fact public finances in most of today's crisis countries (with Greece and Italy as 
major exceptions) were broadly okay before the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) and deteriorated after its outbreak. As shown in Table 2, public debt to GDP stood at 
68.4 per cent in Portugal in 2007, while Ireland and Spain had public debt to GDP ratios of 
25.1 per cent and 36.3 per cent, respectively, much lower than the 60 per cent ratio stipulated 
by the EU's Stability and Growth Pact. In the crisis countries but also elsewhere in Europe, 
public finances deteriorated rapidly when governments responded with anti-cyclical policies 
to the GFC and prolonged recessions. Fiscal positions worsened as tax revenues declined and 
transfer payments grew larger due to rising unemployment during the crisis. In several 
countries, government bailouts of ailing banking systems also contributed to an increase in 
public debt.10 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The worsening of public finances and increases in sovereign risk in the eurozone had 
profound effects on European banks, which had already taken a hit during the GFC due to 
their exposure to the US financial sector. Since most eurozone governments failed to 
recapitalize banks swiftly after the 2008-2009 crisis, their weak banks had severe problems 
coping with deteriorating sovereign risk, which in turn fueled the fear that further bank 
                                                           
9
 Or, as Subramanian put it, "[f]ree capital mobility allowed surpluses from large savers such as Germany to flow 
to capital importers such as Spain, while the perceived elimination of currency risk served to aggravate such 
flows. To investors, Spanish housing assets seemed a great investment, because the forces of economic 
convergence unleashed by the euro would surely push up their prices – and because there was no peseta that 
could lose value. These capital flows created a boom – and a loss of long-term competitiveness – in some 
regions, which was followed by an all-too-predictable bust." 
10
 The most dramatic increase in public debt – from 25.1 per cent in 2007 to 106.4 per cent in 2011 – happened 
in Ireland, where the GFC and the bursting of the property bubble brought the country's banks to the brink of 
collapse. Under pressure from other countries (whose banks were creditors to Irish banks) and the European 
Central Bank, the Irish government guaranteed most liabilities of Irish-owned banks. 
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bailouts would be needed and thereby increased sovereign risk of their home country even 
more. As pointed out by Véron (2011), the interdependence between sovereign credit and 
banking systems has been at the heart of the crisis since sovereign debt of eurozone countries 
are held in large quantities by eurozone banks. Moreover, European banks held large amounts 
of sovereign debt not only from their home country but also from other eurozone countries. 
The large cross-border exposures to sovereign debt of other eurozone countries caused a 
systemic crisis of the entire European banking system which proved hard to handle because 
the eurozone lacked the institutional mechanisms to deal with such problems, including a 
common resolution authority to deal with failing banks. As Véron (2011:1) put it, a vicious 
circle was set in motion in which "twin sovereign and banking crises […] mutually feed each 
other" and lead to a "gradual contagion to more countries and more asset classes". In this 
sense, the European banking and sovereign debt crisis is a consequence and continuation of 
the GFC. 
 
2.3 What could have been done differently to prevent the crisis? 
Of course, the crisis was not inevitable. Macroprudential regulation could have been 
employed at the national level to curtail excessive lending by domestic banks and tame capital 
inflows. This would have helped to avoid property bubbles and the build-up of vulnerabilities 
in the financial sector. In several countries, especially in Ireland and Cyprus where financial 
authorities had deliberately adopted a light-touch regulatory approach to attract foreign 
investments, a stricter regulation of financial markets could have prevented the development 
of an oversized banking sector which later proved too-big-to-rescue for these countries. 
Spanish banking supervisory authorities, which were praised at the onset of the GFC for 
having prevented Spanish banks from investing in subprime assets in the US, should have 
restrained the country's savings banks in financing an unsustainable construction boom which 
later left them with an enormous non-performing loans problem. 
Moreover, policymakers could and should have taken early action to prevent the widening of 
intra-European macroeconomic imbalances. At the national level, economic policies should 
have encouraged wage growth in line with productivity growth to avoid real exchange rate 
appreciation and the loss of long-term competitiveness within the monetary union. The benign 
economic environment that periphery countries enjoyed after adopting the euro should have 
been used by governments to carry out structural reform policies to bring their economies in 
line with the requirements of eurozone membership. 
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At a broader lever, there was a failure to engage in macroeconomic and fiscal coordination 
among eurozone governments, which pursued economic policy as if they were still 
independent economies and not part of a monetary union.11 The lack of macroeconomic and 
fiscal coordination at the European level resulted in divergent wage and price developments 
and macroeconomic imbalances within the eurozone, as discussed above. 
Moreover, the crisis "revealed weaknesses not only in the risk management of many financial 
institutions, but also in the design of supervisory structures and the execution of financial 
supervision" (Speyer 2011:3). In particular, the EU and its member countries failed to create a 
union-wide regulatory structure to effectively supervise pan-European banks.12 Although 
regulation was harmonized across the EU through the First and Second Banking Directives 
and European banks were engaged in extensive cross-border activities across the EU, 
financial market supervision rested entirely with the member countries. Not only did the EU 
fail to create a European financial supervisory authority, it turned out there was also a lack of 
exchange and cooperation between national supervisory authorities. The European 
Commission (2009) summarized the problem as follows: 
"Experience of the financial crisis has exposed important failures in financial supervision, both in particular 
cases and in relation to the financial system as a whole. Current supervisory arrangements proved incapable 
of preventing, managing and resolving the crisis. Nationally-based supervisory models have lagged behind 
the integrated and interconnected reality of today's European financial markets, in which many financial 
firms operate across borders. The crisis exposed serious failings in the cooperation, coordination, consistency 
and trust between national supervisors".13 
Clearly, it was a mistake to push for financial integration without developing an appropriate 
pan-European institutional framework for supervision and resolution of financial institutions. 
The crisis has underscored "the importance of an integrated approach to the EU financial 
                                                           
11
 The Stability and Growth Pact – which requires EU member countries to have an annual budget deficit no 
higher than 3 per cent of GDP and a national debt lower than 60 per cent of GDP or approaching that value – 
was suspended in 2003 under pressure from France, Germany, and Italy which had violated it (along with 
Portugal and Greece). It was revised and effectively watered down in 2005. 
12
 Steps towards the creation of European supervisory authorities to help oversee Europe’s financial sector from 
a pan-European perspective were taken only in late 2008, when the president of the European Commission 
mandated a high-level expert group on financial supervision in the EU. The expert group, led by Jacques de 
Larosière, proposed three new supervisory authorities, which were established in November 2010 and started 
operation in January 2011: the European Banking Authority (EBA) based in London; the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) based in Paris; and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) based in Frankfurt. These three supervisory authorities were complemented by the creation 
of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is responsible for the macroprudential oversight of the 
financial system within the EU and which has a secretariat hosted by the ECB. Together, these institutions form 
the new European System of Financial Supervision. 
13
 The ECB (2012b:31) also conceded that "[t]he financial crisis laid bare a number of weaknesses in the 
institutional setup supporting the single financial market and brought the process of financial integration to a 
halt." 
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safety net", comprising "prudential supervision, deposit insurance, reorganization and 
winding up, and lending of last resort" (Garcia et al. 2009:2).14 Details of a prospective 
"banking union" are now being discussed, which may include three elements: a single 
banking supervisor; a single resolution authority to deal with failing banks; and a single safety 
net to protect depositors.15 
Regarding liquidity support for member governments, it is almost ironic that the EU's 
Medium-term Financial Assistance facility, which was originally designed in 1970 to deal 
with balance-of-payments problems of all member states of the European Community/EU, 
has been restricted since 1999 to EU member countries which have not adopted the euro 
(McKay et al. 2010). In the midst of crisis, European policymakers hence faced the challenge 
of crafting a response from scratch, first agreeing on bilateral lending to Greece and when this 
appeared insufficient, on the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and 
the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). 
 
3. Framing ASEAN financial integration 
3.1 ASEAN's evolving roadmap for financial integration 
The move toward fostering financial integration in ASEAN dates back to 1997, when the 
ASEAN heads of state/government declared in the ASEAN Vision 2020 the goal of creating "a 
stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region in which there is a free 
flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic 
development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities" (ASEAN 1997). To this 
end, the ASEAN leaders pledged to "promote financial sector liberalisation and closer 
cooperation in money and capital market, tax, insurance and customs matters as well as closer 
consultations in macroeconomic and financial policies" (ibid.). 
Several initiatives followed. In October 1998, the ASEAN finance ministers launched the 
ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) "as a mechanism for peer review and exchange of views 
among the senior officials (central bank and finance) and Finance Ministers on recent 
economic developments and policy issues in ASEAN" (ASEAN 2013). 
                                                           
14
 The European Community Directive on the Reorganization and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions (Directive 
2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001) was actually hoped to "provide a 
greater deal of efficiency and certainty in bank insolvency proceedings" (Campbell 2005), especially in the 
context of an international bank insolvency. With hindsight, one can conclude that this did not work. 
15
 See, for instance, the contributions in Beck (2012). 
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In 2003, the ASEAN finance ministers agreed on a Roadmap for Monetary and Financial 
Integration of ASEAN, which laid down the way towards integration of financial markets, 
including "steps, timelines and indicators of activities in four areas: (a) Capital Market 
Development, (b) Liberalisation of Financial Services, (c) Capital Account Liberalisation and 
(d) ASEAN Currency Cooperation" (ASEAN 2013).16 
In November 2007, the ASEAN head of states/government adopted the AEC Blueprint, which 
envisages the implementation of an AEC by 2015.17 In order to achieve the goal of single 
market and production base, the AEC Blueprint comprises far-reaching plans for financial 
services liberalization among member states as well as measures aimed at fostering capital 
market development and integration (see Box 1). In particular, it envisages a "free flow of 
services" across ASEAN that shall apply also to the financial services sector. It puts forward 
"[l]iberalisation measures of the financial services sector [that] should allow members to 
ensure orderly financial sector development and maintenance of financial and socio-economic 
stability" (§22). It explicitly states that financial liberalization measures should proceed 
according to the specific situation of the individual member country ("with due respect for 
national policy objectives and the level of economic and financial sector development of the 
individual members", §22(b)). 
 
[Box 1 about here] 
 
In Section A4 on a "freer flow of capital", the AEC Blueprint calls for several actions for 
strengthening ASEAN capital market development and integration, including a harmonization 
of capital market standards; facilitation of linkages between national exchange and debt 
markets; changes to the taxation of cross-border capital earnings; and the mutual recognition 
of qualification of financial sector professionals. 
Last but not least, the Blueprint also envisages greater capital mobility and demands from 
member countries to "[r]emove or relax restrictions on capital flows, where appropriate and 
possible, to support foreign direct investment and initiatives to promote capital market 
development" (§32ii.). 
                                                           
16
 Already, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) of 1995 envisaged a gradual and sequenced 
liberalization of identified financial services sub-sectors. 
17
 The goal of establishing the AEC was declared in the Bali Concord II in October 2003 (cf. ASEAN 2003). 
Initially, the AEC was to be established by 2020 but at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu in January 2007, 
ASEAN leaders decided to accelerate the establishment of the AEC to 2015. 
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The Strategic Schedule for ASEAN Economic Community (ASEAN Secretariat 2008:30-55) 
pinned down tentative timeframes for achieving the various measures listed in the Blueprint, 
but remained vague regarding financial services sector liberalization, capital market 
development, and integration and capital account liberalization. Over the recent years, several 
further initiatives or schemes have been launched, including the ASEAN Capital Markets 
Forum Implementation Plan to Promote the Development of an Integrated Capital Market to 
Achieve the Objectives of the AEC Blueprint 201518; the Working Committee on Capital 
Account Liberalization Work Plan; and the ASEAN Financial Integration Framework (AFIF), 
which was endorsed by the ASEAN central bank governors in April 2011. In April 2013, the 
central bank governors endorsed in principle the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework 
(ABIF), under which "qualifying ASEAN banks that have the capacity and that are well 
managed [...] will be accorded more flexible access into regional markets" (Aziz 2012:2-3). 
 
3.2 What lessons for ASEAN financial integration can be drawn from the European 
experience? 
Notwithstanding the current financial crisis in Europe, it should be emphasized that the 
empirical evidence suggests that the European financial integration process did generate 
tangible economic benefits in terms of increased firm investment (Bris et al. 2006), improved 
cost efficiency in European banking (Weill 2009), and a decline in nominal and real financing 
costs for European households and firms (ECB 2012b).19 
The lesson for ASEAN should therefore not be that financial integration brings only risks and 
no benefits. Especially for the less developed ASEAN economies, financial integration can be 
an important contributor to financial development – including both banking and capital 
markets – and improve access to finance for firms and households. However, ASEAN 
countries need to make sure to mitigate the risks that come with financial liberalization and 
capital account opening as they try to create integrated ASEAN financial markets. Building 
on the above review of the European experiences with financial integration, the remainder of 
                                                           
18
 The ASEAN Capital Markets Forum was established in 2004 and comprises the capital market regulators of 
all ASEAN members. For the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum Implementation Plan to Promote the Development 
of an Integrated Capital Market to Achieve the Objectives of the AEC Blueprint 2015, see ASEAN Capital 
Markets Forum (2009). 
19
 As the ECB (2012b:43) puts it: "Households and corporations from all euro area countries have benefited to 
substantial, but varying, degree from significantly lower financing costs." It should be borne in mind, however, 
that it was the very success of monetary and financial integration in bringing down financing costs, especially in 
periphery countries, that enabled these countries' credit booms and sowed the seed of crisis. 
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this section will discuss several questions that ASEAN policymakers should contemplate 
when deciding on ASEAN's proposed financial integration process. 
 
How far should capital account liberalization go? 
Several ASEAN countries, along with Korea, learned during the Asian Financial Crisis the 
hard way that capital account liberalization carries substantial risks. As a result, there is a high 
awareness in the region of the perils of capital account opening, which is also the reason why 
several ASEAN countries still maintain rather strict capital controls (Figure 1, Table 3). 
 
[Figure 1 and Table 3 about here] 
 
More financial integration is not necessarily better, especially for smaller economies with less 
developed financial systems and a relatively low level of institutional development such as the 
BCLMV countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). 
International financial integration can have serious implications for macroeconomic and 
financial stability; it increases contagion risk as well as the risk of capital flow bonanzas, 
sudden stops, and a reversal of flows. These risks are especially large for developing countries 
with shallow financial sectors where even small capital movements can have strong effects on 
domestic markets and the exchange rate. It should also be pointed out that capital account 
liberalization would have profound impact on countries' abilities to manage their exchange 
rate, something all ASEAN countries have been doing to different extent. 
Research has shown that the benefits of financial integration can only be reaped when 
countries attain a certain level of institutional and regulatory development (or "threshold 
conditions").20 Hence, it is very sensible that the AEC Blueprint put forward three broad 
principles that shall guide the liberalization of capital movements: "a) Ensuring an orderly 
capital account liberalisation consistent with member countries’ national agenda and readiness 
of the economy; b) Allowing adequate safeguard against potential macroeconomic instability 
and systemic risk that may arise from the liberalisation process, including the right to adopt 
necessary measures to ensure macroeconomic stability; and c) Ensuring the benefits of 
liberalisation to be shared by all ASEAN countries." 
                                                           
20
 See Chinn and Ito (2006), Kose et al. (2009), Frey and Volz (2013) and Garcia and Volz (2013). 
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These principles have been reaffirmed in the recent ADB-ASEAN study (ADB and ASEAN 
2013). The same study, however, insists that "[f]ull and complete capital account and 
financial services liberalization is ultimately key to the success of the AEC. Though a gradual 
and judicious approach is the only pragmatic and feasible option at the present, this must be 
considered as a step toward the eventual elimination of all restrictions on crossborder capital 
flows and financial services" (ADB 2013:27). This raises two questions. First, how fast can 
capital account liberalization in the BCLMV countries but also in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand proceed without doing more harm than good? From experiences 
with capital account liberalization of the past decades, including the European experiences, 
there is good reason to be cautious and liberalize at a rather slow pace. Second, one ought to 
ask the question whether "[f]ull and complete capital account and financial services 
liberalization" (ibid.) really ought to be the goal for all ASEAN members in the foreseeable 
future? After all, "[t]here is still little robust evidence of the growth benefits of broad capital 
account liberalization" (Kose et al. 2011:8).21 
In any case, as capital accounts are liberalized, it will be of utmost importance for monetary 
and financial authorities to closely monitor capital flows and have policy tools at their 
disposal to respond to capital inflow surges or disruptive outflows. Recent experience has 
shown that macroprudential regulation is of particular importance to deal with strong capital 
inflows. Moreover, even in an economy that has already reached an advanced stage of capital 
account liberalization, policymakers should stand ready to re-impose (temporary) capital 
controls if other policies, including monetary, fiscal, and macroprudential policies do not 
suffice to mitigate risks. 
As ASEAN countries liberalize capital accounts, it will also be crucial to further develop a 
comprehensive regional financial safety net. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
(CMIM) has made important progress over the past years, especially with the establishment of 
the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office in Singapore in April 2011 and the decision 
in May 2012 to double the amount available under the CMIM to USD 240 billion. Yet, there 
is still much to do to make the CMIM effective; in particular, ASEAN+3 countries need to 
find agreement on the so-called IMF-linkage, which currently stipulates that a country can 
only access 30 per cent of the funds available from the CMI without having a IMF program 
(cf. Volz 2012b). Given the political stigma the IMF still has in the region, the IMF-link 
                                                           
21
 ADB and ASEAN (2013:13) maintain that "[t]here is a compelling economic case for free capital mobility in 
ASEAN" because "it aids in the efficient allocation of the region’s large savings across national borders, and 
therefore promotes economic growth and welfare." 
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(which the two biggest contributors to the CMIM, China and Japan, insist on) essentially 
prevents countries from seeking assistance from the CMIM.22 
 
What kind of regional financial architecture is needed to ensure stability within a financially 
integrated AEC? 
Several reports have highlighted that financial integration requires regional institution 
building to ensure effective regional monitoring and surveillance. For instance, ADB and 
ASEAN (2013:27) assert that "[t]o make [full and complete capital account and financial 
services liberalization] safe and possible, the ASEAN member states must start creating and 
strengthening the requisite regional institutions." 
While there is a lot of talk of strengthening regional surveillance, there is little discussion 
about the concrete form of institution building that is required. The European experience 
shows clearly that from a certain level of regional financial integration, there is a need for a 
strong regional supervisory structure. While ASEAN is still quite far from the level of 
financial integration that the EU has attained, there needs to be clarity of the implications of a 
unified financial market if this is what is to be achieved in ASEAN. 
The banking crisis in Europe has shown that a system of financial supervision based on the 
principle of home country control combined with minimum standards and mutual recognition 
does not work in a closely integrated financial market and that the latter requires not only 
close collaboration of national supervisors, but common supervisory authorities. Indeed, there 
appears to be a "financial trilemma" (Schoenmaker and Oosterloo 2008, Schoenmaker 2011) 
akin to the trilemma in international macroeconomics. According to the financial trilemma, 
"financial stability, financial integration and national financial policies are incompatible" 
(Schoenmaker 2011:57), and only two of these objectives can be achieved at a time (Figure 
2). As pointed out by Cœuré (2013), "[n]ational financial policies fail to recognise the 
externality generated by cross-border banks in difficulty. As a result, they generate under-
provision of supervision, then of capital for troubled banks with a cross-border and/or 
systemic component. In addition, national supervisors may more easily be subject to 
regulatory capture. Both facts undermine financial stability." 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
                                                           
22
 Indonesia and Korea actually needed support during the GFC but did not seek CMIM support. 
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Even if the financial trilemma gives a stylized view of reality, ASEAN countries will have to 
engage in a discussion on how they want to navigate the financial trilemma and what degree 
of sovereignty they would be willing to transfer to a regional supervisory body. As pointed 
out, by ADB and ASEAN (2013:8), "instituting a uniform regulatory structure across a region 
with many sovereign states at different stages of development is a daunting task as it infringes 
on national sovereignty". However, if ASEAN countries want to launch an ABIF, adequate 
provisions will be needed to ensure an ASEAN-wide supervision of "qualified banks" that 
obtain a single "passport" to operate in any ASEAN country. Moreover, ASEAN supervisory 
authorities should put in place an adequate legal and institutional framework for bank 
resolution procedures that will also work for banks operating across borders. As can be seen 
in Europe, where questions about a pan-European supervision of banks were long shelved, 
they eventually need to be answered and it is better to deal with this issue before crises erupt. 
If ASEAN members are hesitant to transfer banking supervision powers to a regional body, 
then they should not aim for a single market in banking. 
 
What kind of banking system shall ASEAN develop? 
ASEAN countries also ought to consider what kind of banking systems they want to create. 
There is a good case for liberalizing cross-border banking services to improve efficiency and 
reduce cost in banking throughout ASEAN. There is also the danger that too much 
deregulation will contribute to the development of an overly complex banking system and the 
emergence of banking institutions that are too-big-to-fail – and too-big-to-rescue. 
After pointing out that "the market capitalization of all of the 24 ASEAN commercial banks 
combined is smaller than that of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China 
Construction Bank, or Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC)", ADB and 
ASEAN (2013:4) argue that "ASEAN needs to nurture globally competitive banks". 
Furthermore, they anticipate that "[t]he integration of ASEAN banking institutions will create 
an environment conducive to the emergence of such banks. It will build up a customer base 
large enough to support the growth of large competitive banks with a foothold in global 
banking through mergers and the acquisition of small banks" (ibid.). While ASEAN should 
certainly strive to develop competitive banking systems, a vision that emphasizes the 
development of "large competitive banks with a foothold in global banking" may be a very 
risky one as it fails to take account of one of the major lessons of the GFC, namely that large, 
 15 
 
internationally active banks are complex and difficult to supervise, and that financial firms 
that are too-big-to-fail can "become major risks to overall financial stability" (Bernanke 
2010:21). US Fed Chairman Bernanke (2010:21) even went so far as to say that "[i]f the crisis 
has a single lesson, it is that the too-big-to-fail problem must be solved." 
Malaysian central bank governor Azis (2012:3) recently emphasized that currently "[t]here is 
a fundamental rethinking of banking by the international community in the aftermath of the 
recent global crisis" and that one of the lessons is a need "for reduced complexity and 
increased transparency in the banking sector." He further points out that 
"[c]onsistent with the more traditional banking models in this region, there are now increasing calls for a 
return to basic banking and its clear separation from higher risk-taking activities. [...] While the banking 
sector in ASEAN has not reached the degree of complexity observed in the advanced economies, the region 
has to be mindful of the consequences as financial institutions evolve to become increasingly regional in 
orientation. Indeed, such growth must be commensurate with the capacity and capability of both the financial 
institutions and the regulators to manage and oversee the associated risks. [...] ASEAN will have to pursue an 
outcome that facilitates innovation and efficiency, without resulting in undue risks and unwanted costs on 
both the financial system and the overall economy." (ibid.)23 
When creating an integrated market for banking across ASEAN, the focus should be on 
developing banking services that matter for the real economy – and not whether ASEAN 
banks will be able to become internationally leading banks.24 With respect to fostering 
regional economic integration, transaction banking, especially trade finance, will be 
particularly important for ASEAN.25 In wholesale banking, an area where ASEAN banks can 
make important contributions is infrastructure finance. The developing and emerging 
economies of ASEAN have enormous financing needs to upgrade their infrastructure, with 
                                                           
23
 Similarly, former Bank of Japan governor Shirakawa (2012:2) pointed out that "Asian banks have been known 
for their traditional or basic business models, in which loans are funded primarily by domestic deposits. In fact, 
the loan-to-deposit ratios are below 100 percent in many Asian countries. Business models built on such 
domestic deposits are less susceptible to an acute funding squeeze than models dependent on wholesale funding. 
I think this feature has also provided Asian banks with some advantages over their Western counterparts in 
weathering the current crisis." 
24
 In this respect, it is interesting to note that in the 1990s and 2000s European governments were similarly 
concerned with having strong "national champions" that could compete with Wall Street or City banks. For 
instance, as late as September 2008, the German government welcomed the takeover of Dresdner Bank by 
Commerzbank (which had to be bailed out a few months later, in January 2009): "Whether in market 
capitalization or total assets: in international comparison, German banks are not on the front ranks in Europe or 
even in the world. [...] The merger is an opportunity to consolidate the German financial center, which is in the 
interest of the business location Germany" (Bundesregierung 2008:4). 
25
 As the consulting firm Oliver Wyman (2012:12) points out: "Transaction banking provides a strong platform 
for a bank’s regional ambitions because it helps local corporates to achieve their regional growth objectives. 
Domestic banks have entrenched relationships with their corporate client base, typically grounded in credit and 
an onshore cash management and trade offering. This gives them a natural starting point to build a cross-border 
relationship. Given the rapid rise in intra-regional trade, trade finance is expected to be a particularly important 
part of the transaction banking opportunity for internationalizing Asian banks." 
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investment needs estimated at around USD 70 billion per year (e.g. Chaudhuri et al. 2011).26 
Transaction banking and infrastructure financing are areas where ASEAN banks can make 
important contributions to regional development. Yet ASEAN regulators should be careful to 
avoid the emergence of excessively complex banking systems. It will be better to have 
"boring banks" with a strong regional foothold that contribute to the development of the real 
economy rather than globally active super-banks whose activities can be a serious threat to 
financial stability. 
 
4. Conclusion 
With the AEC, ASEAN has embarked on an ambitious integration program that also 
envisages integrated financial markets across ASEAN. The article has focused on the risks 
associated with financial integration which have been accentuated by the recent European 
experiences. It tried to illustrate that financial integration without an appropriate supervisory 
framework has been a major factor behind the European crisis. It should be pointed out, 
however, that financial integration can also bring about substantial benefits if flanked by an 
appropriate regulatory, supervisory, and macroprudential framework. ASEAN countries will 
have to make sure to develop such a framework if they want to pursue their goal of achieving 
a financially integrated single market. 
With respect to European financial integration, Speyer (2011:1) highlights how important it 
has become for European countries to adopt a union-wide supervisory framework: 
"The financial crisis has demonstrated that the co-existence of national supervision and integrated financial 
markets is untenable. Hence, the choice is between either preserving an integrated financial market in the EU 
and creating a corresponding EU-level supervisory framework for it, or allowing the refragmentation of 
Europe's financial markets. The choice is clear." 
ASEAN countries are still at an early stage of financial integration. It should be clear, 
however, that a closely integrated financial market would require ASEAN member countries 
to transfer substantial powers from national supervisors to an ASEAN-level supervisory 
framework in order to guard financial stability. This would be a very far-reaching political 
decision for ASEAN member countries. 
Whatever the degree of financial integration will be aimed at in the end, experience with 
capital account liberalization has shown that sequencing matters greatly and that the 
                                                           
26
 Various initiatives have been launched to support investment in infrastructure, including the ASEAN 
Infrastructure Fund and the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity. 
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dismantling of capital controls should be accompanied by the development of 
macroprudential policies. Especially for the BCLMV countries, whose financial sectors are 
still shallow, capital account liberalization should proceed very gradually. In this respect, the 
envisaged double-track implementation of banking and capital markets integration is sensible, 
where the less developed countries pursue financial services liberalization and especially 
capital account liberalization at a more measured pace that the more advanced ASEAN 
members. 
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Box 1: ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint provisions regarding financial services sector 
liberalization and capital market development and integration 
A. Single Market and Production Base 
 
9. An ASEAN single market and production base shall comprise five core elements: (i) free flow of goods; (ii) 
free flow of services; (iii) free flow of investment; (iv) freer flow of capital; and (v) free flow of skilled labour. 
... 
A2. Free flow of services 
... 
For the financial services sector*, 
22. Liberalisation measures of the financial services sector should allow members to ensure orderly financial 
sector development and maintenance of financial and socio-economic stability. 
Member Countries would be guided by the following principles in pacing their liberalisation measures: 
(a) Liberalisation through ASEAN Minus X formula where countries that are ready to liberalise can proceed first 
and be joined by others later; and 
(b) The process of liberalisation should take place with due respect for national policy objectives and the level of 
economic and financial sector development of the individual members. 
... 
A4. Freer flow of capital 
 
31. Strengthening ASEAN Capital Market Development and Integration. 
Actions: 
i. Achieve greater harmonisation in capital market standards in ASEAN in the areas of offering rules for debt 
securities, disclosure requirements and distribution rules; 
ii. Facilitate mutual recognition arrangement or agreement for the cross recognition of qualification and 
education and experience of market professionals; 
iii. Achieve greater flexibility in language and governing law requirements for securities issuance; 
iv. Enhance withholding tax structure, where possible, to promote the broadening of investor base in ASEAN 
debt issuance; and 
v. Facilitate market driven efforts to establish exchange and debt market linkages, including cross-border capital 
raising activities. 
 
32. Allowing Greater Capital Mobility. 
The liberalisation of capital movements is to be guided by the following principles: 
a) Ensuring an orderly capital account liberalisation consistent with member countries’ national agenda and 
readiness of the economy; 
b) Allowing adequate safeguard against potential macroeconomic instability and systemic risk that may arise 
from the liberalisation process, including the right to adopt necessary measures to ensure macroeconomic 
stability; and 
c) Ensuring the benefits of liberalisation to be shared by all ASEAN countries. 
 
Actions: 
i. Remove or relax restrictions, where appropriate and possible, to facilitate the flows of payments and transfers 
for current account transactions; 
ii. Remove or relax restrictions on capital flows, where appropriate and possible, to support foreign direct 
investment and initiatives to promote capital market development 
... 
 
* All measures for the financial services sector will be subject to prudential measures and balance of payment 
safeguards as provided for under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2008:11-12, 14-15). 
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Table 1: Liberalization of banking activities in EU member states 
 
Lifting of capital 
controls 
Interest rate 
deregulation 
First Banking 
Directive 
Second Banking 
Directive 
Belgium 1991 1990 1993 1994 
Denmark 1982 1988 1980 1991 
France 1990 1990 1980 1992 
Germany 1967 1981 1978 1992 
Greece 1994 1993 1981 1992 
Ireland 1985 1993 1989 1992 
Italy 1983 1990 1985 1992 
Luxembourg 1990 1990 1981 1993 
Netherlands 1980 1981 1978 1992 
Portugal 1992 1992 1992 1992 
Spain 1992 1992 1987 1994 
UK 1979 1979 1979 1993 
Source: Buch and Heinrich (2003:32). 
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Table 2: General government gross debt (per cent of GDP) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU (27 countries) : 69.9 68.3 66.4 65.8 61.9 61.0 60.5 61.9 62.3 62.8 61.6 59.0 62.2 74.6 80.0 82.5 
Belgium 130.2 127.2 122.5 117.2 113.6 107.8 106.5 103.4 98.4 94.0 92.0 88.0 84.0 89.2 95.7 95.5 97.8 
Bulgaria : : 108.3 77.6 77.6 72.5 66.0 52.4 44.4 37.0 27.5 21.6 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.2 16.3 
Czech Republic 14.0 11.9 12.6 14.5 15.8 17.8 23.9 27.1 28.6 28.9 28.4 28.3 27.9 28.7 34.2 37.8 40.8 
Denmark 72.6 69.4 65.4 61.4 58.1 52.4 49.6 49.5 47.2 45.1 37.8 32.1 27.1 33.4 40.6 42.9 46.6 
Germany 55.6 58.5 59.8 60.5 61.3 60.2 59.1 60.7 64.4 66.2 68.5 68.0 65.2 66.8 74.5 82.5 80.5 
Estonia 8.2 7.6 7.0 6.0 6.5 5.1 4.8 5.7 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.4 3.7 4.5 7.2 6.7 6.1 
Ireland 80.1 72.3 63.5 53.0 47.0 35.1 35.2 32.0 30.7 29.5 27.3 24.6 25.1 44.5 64.9 92.2 106.4 
Greece 97.0 99.4 96.6 94.5 94.0 103.4 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.6 100.0 106.1 107.4 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.6 
Spain 63.3 67.4 66.1 64.1 62.4 59.4 55.6 52.6 48.8 46.3 43.2 39.7 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3 
France 55.5 58.0 59.2 59.4 58.9 57.3 56.9 58.8 62.9 64.9 66.4 63.7 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3 86.0 
Italy 120.9 120.2 117.4 114.2 113.0 108.5 108.2 105.1 103.9 103.4 105.7 106.3 103.3 106.1 116.4 119.2 120.7 
Cyprus 51.8 53.1 57.4 59.2 59.3 59.6 61.2 65.1 69.7 70.9 69.4 64.7 58.8 48.9 58.5 61.3 71.1 
Latvia 15.1 13.9 11.1 9.6 12.5 12.4 14.1 13.6 14.7 15.0 12.5 10.7 9.0 19.8 36.7 44.5 42.2 
Lithuania 11.5 13.8 15.4 16.5 22.7 23.6 23.0 22.2 21.0 19.3 18.3 17.9 16.8 15.5 29.3 37.9 38.5 
Luxembourg 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.1 6.4 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.7 14.4 15.3 19.2 18.3 
Hungary 85.6 72.4 62.9 60.9 60.8 56.1 52.7 55.9 58.6 59.5 61.7 65.9 67.0 73.0 79.8 81.8 81.4 
Malta 35.3 40.1 48.4 53.4 57.1 54.9 60.5 59.1 67.6 71.7 69.7 64.0 61.9 62.0 67.6 68.3 70.9 
Netherlands 76.1 74.1 68.2 65.7 61.1 53.8 50.7 50.5 52.0 52.4 51.8 47.4 45.3 58.5 60.8 63.1 65.5 
Austria 68.2 68.1 64.1 64.4 66.8 66.2 66.8 66.2 65.3 64.7 64.2 62.3 60.2 63.8 69.2 72.0 72.4 
Poland 49.0 43.4 42.9 38.9 39.6 36.8 37.6 42.2 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.7 45.0 47.1 50.9 54.8 56.4 
Portugal 59.2 58.2 55.5 51.8 51.4 50.7 53.8 56.8 59.4 61.9 67.7 69.4 68.4 71.7 83.2 93.5 108.1 
Romania 6.6 10.6 15.0 16.8 21.7 22.5 25.7 24.9 21.5 18.7 15.8 12.4 12.8 13.4 23.6 30.5 33.4 
Slovenia 18.6 21.9 22.4 23.1 24.1 26.3 26.5 27.8 27.2 27.3 26.7 26.4 23.1 22.0 35.0 38.6 46.9 
Slovakia 22.1 31.1 33.7 34.5 47.8 50.3 48.9 43.4 42.4 41.5 34.2 30.5 29.6 27.9 35.6 41.0 43.3 
Finland 56.6 57.0 53.9 48.4 45.7 43.8 42.5 41.5 44.5 44.4 41.7 39.6 35.2 33.9 43.5 48.6 49.0 
Sweden 72.8 73.3 71.2 69.9 64.3 53.9 54.7 52.5 51.7 50.3 50.4 45.3 40.2 38.8 42.6 39.5 38.4 
United Kingdom 51.2 51.3 49.8 46.7 43.7 41.0 37.7 37.7 39.1 41.0 42.2 43.3 44.2 52.3 67.8 79.4 85.0 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Eurostat, April 2013. 
Note: The shaded areas indicate a general government gross debt above 60 per cent of GDP. 
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Table 3: Capital controls of ASEAN+3 countries 
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Status under IMF Articles of Agreement               
Article VIII ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Article XIV ● 
Arrangements for Payments and Receipts               
Bilateral payments arrangements  ●  ● ●  ●   ●     
Payments arrears  ●  –  ●         
Controls on payments for invisible transactions and 
current transfers ● 
 
● ● ● ● 
 
● 
     
Proceeds from exports and/or invisible transactions         ■  ●   
Repatriation requirements  ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● ●  ●  
Surrender requirements  ●  ●   ●        
Capital Transactions 
Controls on: 
    Capital market securities – ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Money market instruments – ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Collective investment securities – ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Derivatives and other instruments ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Commercial credits ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Financial credits ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Direct investment ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Liquidation of direct investment ● ● 
    Real estate transactions ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Personal capital transactions ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Provisions specific to: 
    Commercial banks and other credit institutions ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
    Institutional investors ● ● – ● – ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Source: Compiled by author with data from the IMF's 2012 Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (IMF 2012). 
Note: – Indicates that data were not available at the time of publication; ■ Indicates that the 
specified practice is not regulated. 
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Figure 1: Chinn-Ito financial openness index for ASEAN+3 countries for 2011 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data from the Chinn-Ito index website, May 2013 
(http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm). 
Note: The Chinn-Ito index is an index measuring a country's degree of capital account 
openness based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on 
cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (cf. Chinn and Ito 2008). The index ranges from -
2.5 to 2.5, with the former indicating a closed and the latter an open capital account. 
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Figure 2: The trilemma in financial supervision 
1. Integrated financial market 
 
 
 
 
     2. Stable financial system     3. National financial supervision 
Source: Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2008). 
 
